สำหรับผู้ใช้งานแมคอินทอช ให้เลือกไปที่ เมนู Apple แล้วเลือกไปที่ System Preferences สำหรับ OS X หรือเลือก Control Panels สำหรับ OS 9 จากนั้นคลิกเลือกไปที่ Energy Saver แล้วกำหนดตั้งค่าการประหยัดพลังงานตามคำแนะนำ
สำหรับผู้ใช้งานพีซี ให้คลิกขวาลงบนพื้นที่ว่างของหน้าจอเดสก์ท้อป เลือกไปที่เมนู Properties จากนั้นให้เลือกไปที่แท็บ Screen Saver ที่ด้านล่างของหน้าต่างใกล้ ๆ กับโลโก้ของ Energy Star ให้คลิกไปที่ปุ่ม Power หรือ Setting (ขึ้นอยู่กับรุ่นของระบบปฏิบัติการที่กำลังใช้งาน) แล้วกำหนดตั้งค่าประหยัดพลังงานตามคำแนะนำ
References Ambrosio, J. (2000), Knowledge Management Mistakes, //www.computerworld.com/industrytopics/energy/story/0,10801,46693,00.html
Churchman, C.W. (1971), The Design Of Inquiring System, New York, NY. Basic Books.
Davenport, T., & Prusak, L. (1998). Working Knowledge: How Organizations Manage What They Know. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. Fontain, M. & Lesser, E. (2002), Challenges In Managing Organizational Knowledge, IBM Institute For Knowledge-Based Organization Publication. Gartner Group (1998), //www.knowledge-portal.com/knowledge_management_technologies/gartner_group_perspective.htm Hall, H. (2004), Project Baleine Bleue-A Knowledge Management Case Study, //www.dcs.napier.ac.uk/~hazelh/case_studs/km_casebb.htmn Malhotra, Y. (2004), Why Knowledge Management System Fail? Enablers And Constraints Of Knowledge In Human Enterprise, //www.yogeshmalhotra.com Nonaka, I. & Takeuchi, H. (1995), The Knowledge-Creating Company How Japanese Companiescreate The Dynamics Of Innovation, Oxford University Press. Smith, R. (2001), A Roadmap For Knowledge Management, //www2.gca.org/knowledgetechnologies/ 2001/proceedings Wunram, M. (2000), Concepts Of The Corma Knowledge Management Model, Ist Project No 1999-12685, Corma Consortium.
Baumard, Philippe, 1999. Tacit Knowledge in Organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Brohm, Rene and Marleen Huysman, 2003, The Utopia of Communities: An Ethnographic Account of the Rise and Fall of Business Communities. In 5th International Conference on Organizational Learning and Knowledge. University of Lancaster, June 2003. Davenport, Elisabeth and Hazel Hall, 2002, Organizational Knowledge and Communities of Practice. In B. Cronin (Ed.) Annual Review of Information Science and Technology, 36, Information Today Inc., 171-227. Gourlay, Stephen, 2002. Tacit Knowledge, Tacit Knowing or Behaving? 3rd European Organizational Knowledge, Learning, and Capabilities Conference, Athens, Greece, 5-6 April. McDermott, Richard, 1999, Learning Across Teams. Knowledge Management Review, 8, 32-36. Nonaka, Ikujiro and Noboru Konno, 1998, The Concept of Ba: Building a Foundation for Knowledge Creation, California Management Review, 40(3), 40-55. Wenger, Etienne, 1998, Communities of Practice: Learning, Meaning, and Identity. New York: Cambridge University Press
เกี่ยวกับผู้เขียน Michael L. Irick ทำงานในตำแหน่งนักวิเคราะห์ระบบอาวุโสให้กับ The HealthCare Group, LLC นอกจากนั้นแล้ว เขายังเป็นอาจารย์ให้กับภาควิชาคอมพิวเตอร์และเทคดนโลยีสารสนเทศ ที่ IndianaUniversity Purdue University of Indianapolis ช่องทางกาติดต่อของเขา คือ 8802 North Meridian Street, Suite 100, Indianapolis, IN, 46260. หมายเลขโทรศัพท์: 317-705-3213. Email: firstname.lastname@example.org
ITM628 : Managing Tacit Knowledge In Organizations (KM Model)
Journal of Knowledge Management Practice, Vol. 8, No. 3, September 2007 Managing Tacit Knowledge In Organizations Michael L. Irick, Indiana University-Purdue University of Indianapolis ________________________________________ ABSTRACT: This paper examines potential ways to observe and manage the creation and exchange of tacit knowledge within an organization. Techniques such as communities of practice and the use of a shared workspace are evaluated using specific examples from a case study. In addition, the role of management is examined along with several approaches that can be used to facilitate effective knowledge sharing. Keywords: Knowledge Management, Tacit Knowledge, Communities of Practice, Organizational Learning, Management Models ________________________________________ 1. The Concept Of Tacit Knowledge Tacit knowledge has been defined as ones personal, internal or interior knowledge as opposed to the external, physical knowledge that has been written down or recorded as an artifact. Stephen Gourlay presents a clear definition of tacit knowledge as a form of knowledge that is highly personal and context specific and deeply rooted in individual experiences, ideas, values and emotions (Gourlay, 2002). The philosopher Michael Polanyi was the first to differentiate between the tacit, or personal knowledge, and the explicit, or external knowledge domains. Polanyi drew upon ideas originating from Plato to argue that knowledge is internally processed, and is embodied in ones self (Gourlay, 2002). The French philosopher Philippe Baumard has provided the most extensive treatment of tacit knowledge for knowledge management and organizations. According to Baumard, tacit knowledge is important because expertise rests on it, and because it is the source of competitive advantage, as well as being critical to daily management activities (Gourlay, 2002). He argued that tacit knowledge could be an attribute of both individuals and of groups. A key challenge in organizational research has been whether it is possible to manage tacit knowledge, and how. By managing tacit knowledge, I refer to methods that can be used in order to facilitate the creation of tacit knowledge, and to externalize that tacit knowledge in a way that will be transferable to other individuals. The interplay of tacit and explicit knowledge is a critical factor in organizational learning. This article will examine potential ways to observe and manage the creation and exchange of tacit knowledge within an organization, using a recent case study as a point of focus. 2. Management Models For Tacit Knowledge One approach to managing the creation and exchange of tacit knowledge is communities of practice. The primary task of managers is the conversion of tacit, human capital into explicit, structural capital. Communities of practice have been identified as the site where this alchemy can occur (Davenport and Hall, 2002, p. 209). A community of practice has been defined in simple terms as a group that shares knowledge, learns together, and creates common practices. Communities of practice share information, insight, experience, and tools about an area of common interest (McDermott, 1999, p. 34). A community of practice, as differentiated from other kinds of communities or groups, manifests coherence among three dimensions of its practice: a joint enterprise, mutual engagement of its members, and a shared repertoire of resources (Wenger, 1998). A community of practice is therefore different from a team or taskforce, which focuses on specific and/or temporary problems (Brohm and Huysman, 2003, p. 3). Communities of practice are not goal driven, like tasks and projects, nor are they necessarily deadline driven (Davenport and Hall, 2002, p. 181-182). According to Davenport and Hall, communities of practice provide a means of constructing recipes for knowledge development. It is just a matter of building certain structures, such as an intranet, and allocating personnel to those communities, where they will work together to facilitate knowledge development and sharing (Davenport and Hall, 2002, p. 209-210). An example of communities of practice can be found in the case study The Utopia of Communities: An Ethnographic Account of the Rise and Fall of Business Communities. In this case study, Rene Brohm and Marleen Huysman describe the use of communities at C-Nox, a Dutch consulting firm. C-Nox began as a virtual organization, based upon the idea of a network of professionals that are autonomous and self-organizing (Brohm and Huysman, 2003, p. 5). C-Nox was focused on building an intelligent enterprise. In order to support this vision, three communities of practice were formed, referred to by C-Nox as competency groups (Brohm and Huysman, 2003, p. 6). These three groups were formed based on areas of interest and expertise: knowledge technologies (KT), human performance (HP), and management consulting (MC). These communities were formed for the creation and sharing of tacit knowledge. The management team asked the different groups to give concrete meaning to this knowledge in the form of business propositions. C-Nox project teams were responsible for implementing the business propositions that were created by the competency groups. The competency groups used a self-developed intranet as a tool for collaboration and communication. Employees worked from home or at the customers The groups organized half-social, half-work meetings with very little traditional structure, usually at pubs, restaurants, or at home (Brohm and Huysman, 2003, p. 6-11). The communities of practice at C-Nox were not without problems. Knowledge management issues began to arise when economic and political problems started to take control. C-Nox was facing bankruptcy, the competency groups were aborted, and every consultant was to focus on becoming 100% billable. There was also pressure to produce as many business propositions as possible. The knowledge sharing environment was soured by the economic and political issues that were occurring. There were several tacit and explicit behaviors that were externalized by the individuals as well as the groups within C-Nox. The employees resorted to gossip, finger-pointing, insults, and people explicitly ignoring each other (Brohm and Huysman, 2003, p. 7). Eventually, the communities of practice at C-Nox dissolved, except for one group, which continued to function as a community throughout these political and economic changes. This single group branched out on their own, using a holistic, independent approach, outside of the rest of the companys strategy. This group was able to keep their identity and continue to function as a community of practice, and to maintain a fair level of autonomy. By the end of the study, this small group had been the only part in the organization that had been economically successful. Making up less than 15% of the entire company, they were responsible for 60% of C-Noxs revenues (Brohm and Huysman, 2003, p. 15). These collective individuals were able to adapt to the political and economic conditions at C-Nox, and thus were able to survive. We can see from this example how a community of practice can be used to facilitate the creation of tacit knowledge and the sharing of knowledge amongst individuals as a collective group. If managed effectively, the community of practice can be a rich, nurturing environment that can produce tangible, external results in an organization, like the group in the C-Nox case study, which was able to bring in the majority of the revenues for the company. Management needs to acknowledge the important value that communities of practice can bring to an organization by allowing adequate attention and autonomy for these types of groups to grow organically in the creation and sharing of tacit knowledge. Richard McDermott (McDermott, 1999, p. 36) offers several guidelines to managers in order to start and support communities of practice within an organization. He suggests: Focus on a few important topics. In order to leverage knowledge effectively, companies should begin with a few communities of practice that are focused on topics strategically important to the organization. Build on natural networks. Since communities of practice arise naturally in most organizations, utilize those existing networks of people who already share knowledge about a particular topic. Develop community coordinators and core groups that will organize and maintain the community. Support communities managers need to give people the time and encouragement to reflect and share ideas with other teams. Be patient communities of practice are organic, and take time to develop. McDermott suggests the concept of a double-knit organization, which combines teams with communities of practice. According to McDermott, this approach links the organization in two ways: cross-functional teams focus on outputs (typically products), major processes, or market segments, and the communities of practice focus on learning within functions or disciplines, sharing information and insight, collaborating on common problems and stimulating new ideas. At C-Nox, the management team tried to utilize a double-knit approach with the competency groups that created the business propositions, and the project teams that implemented the business propositions. This approach may have worked if C-Nox had given adequate support to the building of these communities of practice. Instead, the economic and political pressures led to the management teams decision to focus strictly on output of products and billable hours. Another approach to managing the creation and exchange of tacit knowledge is the creation of a shared workspace, or environment, for the elicitation and sharing of knowledge. Ikujiro Nonaka writes about the concept of ba (a Japanese concept meaning place). According to Nonaka, ba can be thought of as a shared space for emerging relationships. This space can be physical (an office, dispersed business space), virtual (e-mail, teleconference), mental (shared experiences, ideas, ideals) or any combination of them. What differentiates ba from ordinary human interaction is the concept of knowledge creation. According to Nonaka, ba provides a platform for advancing individual and collective knowledge. Knowledge is embedded in ba where it is then acquired through ones own experience or reflections on the experiences of others (Nonaka and Konno, 1998, p. 40-41). To managers, this means providing an environment, whether it is physical or virtual, that will lend itself to the creation and sharing of tacit knowledge. According to Nonaka, there are two dimensions to tacit knowledge. The first is the technical dimension, which encompasses the kind of informal personal skills often referred to as know-how. The second dimension is cognitive. The cognitive dimension consists of beliefs, ideals, values, and mental models, which are often taken for granted (Nonaka and Konno, 1998, p. 42). Nonaka introduces the SECI model, or knowledge spiral, as a way to show how the interactions between explicit and tacit knowledge lead to the creation of new knowledge. The SECI model describes the dynamic process in which explicit and tacit knowledge are exchanged and transformed. Nonaka argues that this idea can be put into practice, using the concepts of ba. The four steps of the SECI process are socialization, externalization, combination, and internalization. Socialization involves the sharing of tacit knowledge between individuals. In practice, socialization involves capturing knowledge through physical proximity. Externalization involves the articulation of tacit knowledge; that is, the conversion of tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge. Combination involves the conversion of explicit knowledge into more complex sets of explicit knowledge. Finally, internalization is the conversion of explicit knowledge into the organizations tacit knowledge (Nonaka and Konno, 1998, p. 42-45). Managers should be aware of this process when developing an environment for knowledge sharing in their organization. Knowledge is manageable only insofar as leaders embrace and foster the dynamism of knowledge creation (Nonaka and Konno, 1998, p. 53). 3. Observations Of Tacit Knowledge A company is a living organism and can have a collective sense of identity and fundamental purpose. There are several kinds of behaviors that can be observed from individuals or groups within an organization. Some of these behaviors may be externalized, or converted from internal behaviors to external behaviors. Managers should be aware of these behaviors for the purpose of managing knowledge within an organization. More specifically, these behaviors can indicate potential strengths or weaknesses in the knowledge environment of an organization. Philippe Baumard has defined four different categories of knowledge, and the observable behaviors that can be exhibited in each. These four types are: observed explicit individual behaviors, observed explicit collective behaviors, observed tacit individual behaviors, and observed tacit collective behaviors (Baumard, 1999). Observed explicit individual behaviors include lying in wait, explicit avoidance, attempting to verbalize the situation, conflict seeking, showing awareness of the situation, and a focus on problem solving (Baumard, 1999). Several examples of these behaviors can be seen in the C-Nox case study. For example, the competency groups at C-Nox exhibited explicit avoidance when individuals purposely avoided each other. Conflict seeking and attempts to verbalize the situation were also observed as individuals resorted to gossip, finger pointing, and insults (Brohm and Huysman, 2003, p. 7). Observed explicit collective behaviors include collective involvement, collective avoidance, deliberate sharing of knowledge, formation of a team or task force, and striving for collective sense making (Baumard, 1999). Observed explicit collective behaviors in the case study include formation of a team or task force, collective involvement, and striving for collective sense making as the groups were originally formed based on different interest areas. The competency groups showed collective involvement as they worked amongst themselves, but also tended to collectively avoid the other groups after problems began to arise within the C-Nox organization (Brohm and Huysman, 2003). Observed tacit individual behaviors include floating attention, infiltration, automatic behavior, reflexes or instincts, resentments, suppressed conflicts, web of tacit relations, mixed feelings, or thriving on chaos (Baumard, 1999). In the case study, individual tacit behaviors included floating attention, resentments, and mixed feelings as certain individuals showed resentment towards C-Nox. In addition, when one of the group leaders became part of the management team, mixed feelings and behaviors of resentment and suppressed conflict were also observed (Brohm and Huysman, 2003). Observed tacit collective behaviors include communities of practice, things are done without needing explanation, network of tacit understanding, collective orientation is sought, atmosphere is uncomfortable, inference and insinuation, or emergent attitude of knowledge sharing (Baumard, 1999). Within C-Nox, there were several observed tacit collective behaviors, such as the formation of the communities of practice (competency groups). Also, an uncomfortable atmosphere emerged as fighting and avoidance among groups became explicit. Several inferences and insinuations about competing groups were observed, leading to a negative impact on the organization (Brohm and Huysman, 2003). 4. The Role Of Managers It is the role of managers to encourage and support the creation and exchange of tacit knowledge. Managers should act as knowledge brokers, contributing to the diffusion of knowledge across and between communities. Nonaka and Konno suggest that the role of the broker is essential to the interplay of tacit and explicit knowledge. It is the role of top management to be providers of ba for knowledge creation (Nonaka and Konno, 1998, p. 53). Several ways that tacit knowledge can be managed have already been offered. For example, managers can offer assistance in the creation and continuation of communities of practice, they can provide a shared work environment that is conducive to the advancement of individual and collective knowledge, they can utilize the double-knit strategy that McDermott proposes, and managers should be aware of the observed behaviors that indicate how knowledge is being shared in the organization. These are all ways that a manager can facilitate the conversion of human capital into structural capital by turning the internal, tacit knowledge into external, explicit knowledge. More specifically, there are several techniques that managers can use in managing tacit knowledge. One way is for managers to offer personnel training and exercises to allow the individual to access the knowledge realm of the group and the entire organization. For example, training programs in larger organizations help trainees to understand the organization and their roles in the whole (Nonaka and Konno, 1998, p. 45). Teaching people new concepts or methods for how to share knowledge can be useful. Additionally, managers need to provide motivation for knowledge sharing activities. The willingness to share anything usually depends on reciprocity. Therefore, knowledge management strategies need to be linked to people by building reward and recognition programs to encourage employees to share best practices, strategies, and ideas (Davenport and Hall, 2002, p. 186). A manager may explicitly reward an individual who participates in knowledge sharing activities in the form of a tangible benefit, such as increased pay or bonuses in the forms of cash or stock options (Davenport and Hall, 2002, p. 187). Instead, employees may be rewarded in more subtle ways, such as enjoying the personal satisfaction of holding membership in a thriving, knowledge sharing community. Human concerns about reputation and status lies behind an important soft reward for knowledge sharing activities, such as acknowledgement from peers (Davenport and Hall, 2002, p. 189). In addition to rewards, organizations can set up a range of other types of incentives to encourage knowledge sharing. These include making knowledge sharing part of the job of each individual, encouraging employees to work in groups as communities, allowing experimentation and risk-taking, and providing tools for these activities (Davenport and Hall, 2002, p. 190). In the C-Nox study, employees used a self-developed intranet as a tool for collaboration and communication (Brohm and Huysman, 2003, p. 5). Managers are responsible for providing these types of incentives and tools that are needed to facilitate knowledge sharing activities. Also, time spent in working hours on knowledge sharing activities should be regarded as legitimate (Davenport and Hall, 2002, p. 191). This may require a significant change in mindset on behalf of managers and their employees. In fact, time should be set aside specifically for individuals to learn, share, and help one another. Leading by example can also have a positive impact on knowledge management (Davenport and Hall, 2002, p. 191). Managers should be positive role models in the knowledge sharing process. This will help to build trust, which is critical in the knowledge sharing environment. Each contribution to knowledge sharing increases not only the amount of knowledge, but also trust among community members. As trust increases, more participants will become willing to share, and further contributions will be made (Davenport and Hall, 2002, p. 192). Further, the knowledge sharing depends upon social interactions. The easier it is for individuals to interact, the more likely that interactions will occur (Davenport and Hall, 2002, p. 193). Managers can use the following techniques to improve the ease of social interaction: clear rules on the operation of the community, a shared language, social events, and physical co-location of staff (Davenport and Hall, 2002, p. 193). In addition to how easy it is to interact, the perceived usefulness of interacting is also a primary motivation. The provision of a suitable technological infrastructure, such as an intranet, for knowledge creation and sharing is thus important (Davenport and Hall, 2002, p. 195). In the C-Nox case study, managers did not effectively utilize many of these techniques, and thus, the knowledge sharing process for the most part did not survive. At the beginning of the case study, the management team was focused on establishing communities of practice built on trust and autonomy. Then, during economic and political pressures, they began to lose sight of the importance of these groups, focusing instead on billability and on producing products. The management team at C-Nox no longer granted the groups the time that they needed for knowledge creation and sharing, and they destroyed the trust that was built within the groups. The management team did not reward the communities of practice, but took rather the opposite approach in condemning their work. They viewed the communities as just theoretical activity and as being of little use to the actual business practice (Brohm and Huysman, 2003). The focus of the intranet became a commercial product rather than a tool for sharing knowledge. The management team made many mistakes that led to the downfall of the knowledge environment in the organization. 5. Conclusion The interplay of tacit and explicit knowledge is a critical factor in organizational learning. It is the role of managers to contribute to this interplay of tacit and explicit knowledge, and to act as knowledge brokers within the organization. The primary task of managers is the conversion of tacit, human capital into explicit, structural capital. Communities of practice have been identified as the site where this alchemy can occur (Davenport and Hall, 2002, p. 209). This report has examined several potential ways to observe and manage the creation and exchange of tacit knowledge within an organization, using the C-Nox case study as a point of focus. The C-Nox example cannot be construed as representative of every organization, but certainly provides a good example of some of the issues and problems common in many of todays organizations. There is still a great deal of research to be done in this area, and additional case studies that examine the management of tacit knowledge within organizations would be beneficial. However, I believe that it is possible for managers, at least to some extent, to be able to manage the creation and sharing of tacit knowledge by using the methods and techniques presented in this article. 6. References Baumard, Philippe, 1999. Tacit Knowledge in Organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Brohm, Rene and Marleen Huysman, 2003, The Utopia of Communities: An Ethnographic Account of the Rise and Fall of Business Communities. In 5th International Conference on Organizational Learning and Knowledge. University of Lancaster, June 2003. Davenport, Elisabeth and Hazel Hall, 2002, Organizational Knowledge and Communities of Practice. In B. Cronin (Ed.) Annual Review of Information Science and Technology, 36, Information Today Inc., 171-227. Gourlay, Stephen, 2002. Tacit Knowledge, Tacit Knowing or Behaving? 3rd European Organizational Knowledge, Learning, and Capabilities Conference, Athens, Greece, 5-6 April. McDermott, Richard, 1999, Learning Across Teams. Knowledge Management Review, 8, 32-36. Nonaka, Ikujiro and Noboru Konno, 1998, The Concept of Ba: Building a Foundation for Knowledge Creation, California Management Review, 40(3), 40-55. Wenger, Etienne, 1998, Communities of Practice: Learning, Meaning, and Identity. New York: Cambridge University Press. ________________________________________ About the Author: Michael L. Irick is a Senior Systems Analyst at The HealthCare Group, LLC. He is also an adjunct professor in the Computer and Information Technology department at Indiana University-Purdue University of Indianapolis. He can be reached by mail at 8802 North Meridian Street, Suite 100, Indianapolis, IN, 46260. Phone: 317-705-3213. Email: email@example.com วารสารการปฏิบัติเพื่อการจัดการความรู้ ชุดที่ 8 เล่มที่ 3, กันยายน 2550
ITM628 Exploring Failure-Factors of Implementing KMS in Organization
Journal of Knowledge Management Practice, May 2005 Exploring Failure-Factors Of Implementing Knowledge Management Systems In Organizations Peyman Akhavan , Mostafa Jafari, Mohammad Fathian, Iran University of Science and Technology ________________________________________ ABSTRACT: Nowadays organizations have realized the importance of knowledge and knowledge management. The organizations know that machines, equipments, and building cannot count as the most important properties of the organization. It is clear that the most important property of every organization is organizational knowledge and correct management of it will cause core competencies for the organization and also victory against the competitors. Of course knowledge and knowledge management both are important for an organization, but are all knowledge management efforts in the organizations successful? If knowledge management efforts fail in an organization, what are the main failure factors of this phenomenon? This paper attempts to answer this question by analyzing a failed case study in implementing a knowledge management system . ________________________________________ Introduction Knowledge is power, especially in the Internet age. That's why companies are trying to figure out precisely what their customers want and how to get it to them before the competition does. Whatever you call it as collaboration, decision support, knowledge management or something else - it's the bedrock that is supporting today's corporate strategies. The management of the intellectual capital of the organization has become increasingly important in the knowledge-based society. Both commercial and public organizations recognize the significance of being effective learning organizations and therefore there is a growing need for individuals who have the appropriate training and experience in the Knowledge Management function. Knowledge management creates a new working environment where knowledge and experience can easily be shared and also enables information and knowledge to emerge and flow to the right people at the right time so they can act more efficiently and effectively (Smith,2001). Knowledge management is also known as a systematic, goal oriented application of measures to steer and control the tangible and intangible knowledge assets of organizations, with the aim of using existing knowledge inside and outside of these organizations to enable the creation of new knowledge, and generate value, innovation and improvement out of it (Wunram, 2000; pp.2-13). The Gartner Group (1998) cites that: "Knowledge Management promotes an integrated approach to identifying, capturing, retrieving, sharing, and evaluating an enterprises information assets. These information assets may include databases, documents, policies, procedures, as well as the un-captured tacit expertise and experience stored in individual's heads." Trouble is, many of these costly, information-laden efforts are doomed. Some researchers peg the failure rate of knowledge management projects at 50%. But Daniel Morehead, director of organizational research at British Telecommunications PLC in Reston says the rate is closer to 70%. "Most knowledge management projects simply don't hit their stated goals and objectives," Morehead says. So that 70% doesn't mean they fail totally - it means that they don't accomplish what they set out to do. Liam Fahey, an adjunct professor at Babson College in Wellesley, says the higher failure rates can be attributed to knowledge management (KM) initiatives that rely too heavily on technology. Just moving data around may or may not add value to anyone in the enterprise (Ambrosio, 2000). Churchman (1971) has emphasized that to treat knowledge as a collection of information is to rob the concept of all of its life; he posits that knowledge resides in the user and not in the collection. Similarly, Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) had proposed that knowledge, unlike information, is about beliefs and commitment. On a complementary note, Davenport and Prusak (1998; pp.21) have defined knowledge as deriving from minds at work: "Knowledge is a fluid mix of framed experience, values, contextual information, and expert insight that provides a framework for evaluating and incorporating new experiences and information. It originates in the minds of knowers. In organizations, it often becomes embedded not only in documents or repositories but also in organizational routines, processes, practices, and norms." Knowledge is at the heart of knowledge management. In literature, a lot of studies have been suggested covering the role of knowledge in improving the performance of management. However, there are few studies about investigating main failure factors in the arena of knowledge management and this subject encouraged the authors of this paper to focus on it. Through literature review about knowledge management failure factors Malhotra (2004) cites that: Prior discussion has highlighted that knowledge management systems fail because of two broad reasons. First, knowledge management systems are often defined in terms of inputs such as data, information technology, best practices, etc., that by themselves may be inadequate for effective business performance. For these inputs to result in business performance, the influence of intervening and moderating variables such as attention, motivation, commitment, creativity, and innovation, has to be better understood and accounted for in design of business models. Second, the efficacy of inputs and how they are strategically deployed are important issues often left unquestioned as 'expected' performance outcomes are achieved, but the value of such performance outcomes may be eroded by the dynamic shifts in the business and competitive environments . Ambrosio (2000) cites that the most common error in implementing knowledge management system is failing to coordinate efforts between information technology and human resources. He also says that starting with a low-profile project, not changing the compensation scheme to reward teamwork, building the grand database in the sky to house all your company's knowledge, and assuming someone else will lead the change are the other common errors during knowledge management implementation in the organization that cause failure in KM efforts. Malhotra (2004) also notes that design of KM system should ensure that adaptation and innovation of business performance outcomes occurs in alignment with changing dynamics of the business environment. Simultaneously, conceiving multiple future trajectories of the information technology and human inputs embedded in the KMS can diminish the risk of rapid obsolescence of such systems. Working with leading companies and government organizations, the IBM Institute for Knowledge-Based Organizations has identified a number of important roadblocks that organizations typically face when implementing knowledge management programs. These roadblocks are (Fontain & Lesser, 2002; pp.2-5): Failure to align knowledge management efforts with the organizations strategic objectives. Creation of repositories without addressing the need to manage content Failure to understand and connect knowledge management into individuals daily work activities An overemphasis on formal learning efforts as a mechanism for sharing knowledge Focusing knowledge management efforts only within organizational boundaries. Although these are not meant to be an exhaustive list, they represent issues that can hinder the effectiveness of a knowledge management effort, costing organizations time, money, resources andperhaps, most importantlytheir ability to affect meaningful business results. In the next part of the paper we explore a fictional case study about failure in KM efforts, the Calibro company. The complete documents of case study are available at the reference that the readers can refer to it for more information (Hall, 2004). An Introduction To Calibro Company Calibro is a large European pharmaceutical company based in Switzerland with research labs around the world. The overall goal of implementing knowledge management system in Calibro was to provide a collaborative working environment for distributed research staff working on new drug development. The plan was that it would comprise the "Knowledge Store" and a series of "e-rooms". The Knowledge Store would hold documents of common interest to the researchers (supplied by them). The e-rooms were "places" for discussion groups to "meet". It was anticipated that this project would increase knowledge sharing and collaborative working throughout the firm, particularly across national boundaries, and that this would lead to faster drug development amongst the 1000 distributed research staff. This project was named Baleine Bleue (BB). The Initiative For Knowledge Management System The initiative for Project BB resulted from a chance conversation in 1997 at an internal conference between a leader of one of the big research labs - Pascal Delacarte - and Sandy McDonald, a new member of staff who had recently been recruited to the Internal Communications Division of the company from a large US law firm. In the law firm Sandy had had some involvement in intranet development as part of its knowledge management strategy. She convinced Pascal that the existing technical infrastructure at Calibro could be exploited further if some efforts were put into turning it into a platform for the better organisation of existing resources, as well as the creation of new facilities for communication between staff at the different research centres across the world. Pascal was intrigued by this because he had just read a review of Working knowledge (Davenport & Prusak, 1998) in a management magazine. He was also very interested to hear from Sandy that it was possible to have a "knowledge management system" and thought that this would overcome numerous problems with the information infrastructure at Calibro. For example: Many so-called internally developed "web resources" had been created with initial enthusiasm, but were later neglected and eventually abandoned (yet were still accessible on the system). There were many dead links on the system. In cases where good information content existed it was often difficult to find because (a) it was poorly indexed and/or (b) resources were held on "private" servers. This was a particular problem if the originator of the material moved departments or left the company. Even access to more "official" company resources, such as clinical trial information and the main customer information database, was difficult due to poor awareness of its availability and poor indexing. There was a huge diversity in formats of information held. To date, senior management had shown little interest in knowledge management. The BB Project Team Sandy McDonald was keen to make her mark in the company as a new employee with bright ideas and she persuaded Pascal to second one of his junior research staff, Karl Schwartz, to Internal Communications to help her design a prototype "knowledge management system". A placement student in Internal Communications, Paul North, who had been looking for a suitable piece of work that would tie in with his degree in Marketing, also joined the team. They christened the project Baleine Bleue (BB) and started their work by reading up on KM and attending some commercial training courses. Sandy was confident that it would not take long to get a prototype up and running, and did not think it necessary to specify a timescale for the work. There was no separate budget. The project itself was funded entirely through Internal Communications and Karl's salary continued to be paid out of the budget of Pascal's research lab. Recruiting Support For The Project Because none of the BB team had been in the company for long, they used an organizational chart to identify who to talk to about the proposed work. Because of cost restrictions, they were only able to meet face-to-face with people based in Geneva. To encourage research staff in other locations to participate in the planning of the knowledge store and e-rooms, Paul created a project web site with discussion space on the corporate intranet, then advertised these using the e-mail distribution list for drug development staff. The reaction from the people met face-to-face was that they were happy to offer broad notional support to BB, but when asked to commit to the development of the system they were reluctant to do so. Most cited a lack of time and the pressure of other priorities. Some were resistant to the possibility of change to their work practices. The BB team was disappointed that there were few hits on the project web site and not a single entry in the discussion space. There were some rather negative reactions to the e-mail announcement of the project. Some people were concerned that this had come "out of the blue" and were suspicious that the initiative appeared to be instigated by people in marketing. They could not understand why management had not made the announcement. Some even said that although the current means of executing collaborative work were not perfect, they were workable. Despite these set-backs, however, Sandy was determined to follow her idea through. Development Of The Prototype As a result of attending some commercial KM training courses the BB team was approached by "KM solution" vendors offering off-the-shelf KM applications. Some time was invested in evaluating the available software. However, it continued to be the preference of the BB team to develop a system in-house. This was mainly on the basis of cost, and also because no off-the-shelf package appeared to match the requirements of Calibro. Karl took charge of the developing the infrastructure for the Knowledge Store, with the intention of integrating the e-rooms later. It was at this point that Sandy realised that she did not have an adequate technical skills set to help with this part of the work. The project was taking much longer than anticipated. Meanwhile Paul was struggling to make sense of test documents to be loaded into the Knowledge Store. He had problems persuading people in the labs to provide him with material that could be mounted on the prototype system, and, when he did manage to acquire material, his lack of subject knowledge made it difficult for him to work out the most appropriate location for the resources. Sandy suggested that a taxonomy should be adopted for all material: potential end users argued that if the system allowed free-text searching there would be no need for a taxonomy. Demonstration Of The Prototype The BB team now realised that the project was much bigger than originally envisaged. If they were to implement their knowledge management system, they needed much more support from the business. They needed to demonstrate the prototype as soon possible that they had a functioning tool. This would attract more support to the project. Nine months after Pascal and Sandy's initial conversation, demonstrations of BB were arranged locally and drug development staff showed some interest. They said that they looked forward to using the Knowledge Store when it contained valuable content. Until then, they would continue to use their existing mechanisms for storing and finding information. Since the e-rooms were not ready to demonstrate, it was not possible for the drug development staff to comment on their potential. The End Of BB Not long after the demonstrations Karl announced that he had decided to return to research work and left to start a new job at a different drug company. Pascal refused to second another member of staff to Internal Communications. This left Sandy and Paul on their own, with just three months left of Paul's placement. When Paul returned to university in the autumn the prototype was still not fully functional. Sandy did not have the skills, time or enthusiasm to continue the project on her own. It was abandoned. Analysis Of Knowledge Management Failure Factors In Calibro As it was explained in the previous section, first idea of implementing knowledge management system in Calibro company was a conference that manager of Calibro had taken part in it and also studying a book about knowledge management. Even after the manager decided to implement a knowledge management in his company, he himself didnt study more and hadnt deep understanding about the subject. Theses subjects caused that he didnt support the project in different times and specially at some milestones that the project needed direct support of management. So we can say that lack of commitment and support of management had a main role in failure of knowledge management project in Calibro. Also this subject that the management was not familiar with knowledge management dimensions was effective in failure. The other factor of failure was selecting someone for leading the knowledge team that was not sophisticated enough to manage the knowledge project. Manager of Calibro made a mistake by this wrong selection because in spite the fact that the knowledge management leader showed tendency to manage the project, he/she didnt have expertise about knowledge management and this made many problems during the implementing of the project. The selected leader couldnt control and manage the project effectively and also couldnt pass it safe through crises and solve the bottlenecks. Unfortunately the employees who were selected as the knowledge management team members didnt have competency for this duty. They were also unconscious and didnt have sophistication and knowledge about the dimensions of knowledge management. It shouldnt be forgotten that the variety and the number of employees who were involved directly in the project were not enough (only three persons). Also there were only one person who was selected from the company for the team, and he hadnt high rank of authority in the company. So the selected team hadnt good familiarity with the organization and its internal relations and occasionally the project implementation faced with crises. Also lack of someone that hadnt higher rank of authorities in the company caused that knowledge management team hadnt had enough strength for maneuvering in the organization. Wrong planning and incorrect forecasting about the dimensions of the project were the other important failure factors of the project. Knowledge team leader didnt consider that the project took so long and due to increasing the time of project, he/she missed control on it. Considering the fact that implementing an important project such as knowledge management system needs money, it is necessary to assign separate and suitable budget for it. But in Calibro this wasnt done and the project started and continued by current budget of Calibro laboratories. This faced the project with financial problems because an independent budget hadnt assign to it. Lack of cooperation between organization employees and knowledge management team is the other factor of project failure. We should consider the main reasons of this in some topics such as lack of suitable infrastructure, lack of transparent support of management between employees, organizational culture and finally resistance against the change. When the employees understood that top management didnt support the project directly and also didnt know the project as a high priority, so they didnt cooperate with the project and said sentences such as: I have another important projects in my hand, the priority of this project is lower than current projects, I dont have enough time to do this projects, . Organizational culture also plays an important role in knowledge management projects in the organizations, but in Calibro, suitable culture was not prepared. The employees were also worry about the changes during knowledge management systems implementation and top management and the team leader didnt have any program to conquer the resistance against the change. This factor was the other reason of knowledge management system failure in Calibro company. As the current systems of Calibro had not been studied completely, knowledge management team faced with many problems during the creation of knowledge storage bases and repositories especially when they understood nonconformities between new systems and current systems. For solving these problems, it was necessary to spend much more money and time, so this factor also played an important role in knowledge management failure. The ten most important failure factors of knowledge management system implementation are summarized below: 1. Lack of familiarity of top management with dimensions of KM and its requirement 2. Selecting an unsophisticated and inexperienced person for leading KM team 3. Improper selection of knowledge team members 4. Wrong planning and improper forecasting for the project 5. Lack of separate budget for knowledge management project 6. Organizational culture 7. Lack of support and commitment of top management 8. Resistance against the change 9. Inability of KM team for distinguishing organizational relations 10. Nonconformities between current systems and new systems These factors and the relations between them have been illustrated in Figure 1. As it has been depicted in the figure, lack of CEO support and commitment is located in the center of the figure that shows the violent importance of this factor clearly. Considering the lack of CEO support and commitment, some factors follow it. Improper team leader selection, lack of separate budget for knowledge management project, lack of familiarity with knowledge management dimensions and also lack of cooperation between knowledge team and employees are the factors that run after lack of CEO support and commitment. Figure 1 - Failure Factors Of Knowledge Management Systems
Of course when the CEO himself doesnt support the project directly and doesnt commit to it, he is not sensitive to selecting a meritorious person for leading the project. He also doesnt feel that he himself should understand knowledge management deeply and because of lack of familiarity with the dimensions of the project, he will not support allocation a separate budget for it, so the project faces with financial problems during implementation. Also when the other employees understand that CEO himself doesnt mind and support the project, so they dont cooperate with knowledge team members and the project faces with some obstacles in progress . It is also depicted in the figure 1, knowledge team leader plays an important role and if he/she isnt selected properly and doesnt have sophistication, the project will face with some problems such as incorrect planning and forecasting. Also as the team leader doesnt have enough knowledge and sophistication about the project , so he/she will mistake in selecting team members including problems about the number and also variety of specialists that are needed for putting the project forward. Lack of enough knowledge for team leader also makes some problems for adapting available system with new systems. It shouldnt be forgotten that some organizational problems such as available culture and organizational relations, existing systems and also resistance against the change are the other main factors that play important role in failure of knowledge management efforts, specially the factor of resistance against the change is a subject that should be studied carefully by CEO and knowledge management team leader through organizational culture. Conclusion Nowadays the managers have understood the importance of knowledge and knowledge management in the organization and many of them are following the implementation of knowledge management system through their organization. On the other hand many of them are worried about inability of correct implementing of knowledge management system in their organization and their knowledge management project faces with failure. In this paper, after some explanations about knowledge management , the main failure factors of implementing KM system in pharmacist company Calibro have been analyzed. Through the analysis, it is clear that lack of top management commitment and support, improper selection of knowledge tem leader and members, improper planning, lack of separate budget for knowledge management project, organizational culture, lack of cooperation between team members and employees, and resistance against the change are the main failure factors of knowledge management system. References Ambrosio, J. (2000), Knowledge Management Mistakes, //www.computerworld.com/industrytopics/energy/story/0,10801,46693,00.html Churchman, C.W. (1971), The Design Of Inquiring System, New York, NY. Basic Books. Davenport, T., & Prusak, L. (1998). Working Knowledge: How Organizations Manage What They Know. Boston: Harvard Business School Press. Fontain, M. & Lesser, E. (2002), Challenges In Managing Organizational Knowledge, IBM Institute For Knowledge-Based Organization Publication. Gartner Group (1998), //www.knowledge-portal.com/knowledge_management_technologies/gartner_group_perspective.htm Hall, H. (2004), Project Baleine Bleue-A Knowledge Management Case Study, //www.dcs.napier.ac.uk/~hazelh/case_studs/km_casebb.htmn Malhotra, Y. (2004), Why Knowledge Management System Fail? Enablers And Constraints Of Knowledge In Human Enterprise, //www.yogeshmalhotra.com Nonaka, I. & Takeuchi, H. (1995), The Knowledge-Creating Company How Japanese Companiescreate The Dynamics Of Innovation, Oxford University Press. Smith, R. (2001), A Roadmap For Knowledge Management, //www2.gca.org/knowledgetechnologies/ 2001/proceedings Wunram, M. (2000), Concepts Of The Corma Knowledge Management Model, Ist Project No 1999-12685, Corma Consortium.